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INTRODUCTION
Federal habeas corpus’ once narrow scope changed dramatically over two
centuries through statutory expansion in the late nineteenth century and judicial
expansion in the early twentieth century. Consequentially, the latter half of the
twentieth century saw a rapid rise in habeas petitions that threatened conservation
of judicial resources, federalism, and finality in criminal convictions. In response,
Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA),1 which created new procedural and substantive hurdles for state
prisoners to pass through before they could receive federal habeas relief.
Post-AEDPA empirical studies show that many of AEDPA’s goals have not
been accomplished. Furthermore, scientific developments in DNA testing have
questioned whether one of the underlying reasons for passing AEDPA—finality in
criminal convictions—warrants as much weight as it once did. This Article will
outline judicial decisions that expanded federal habeas corpus, subsequent
criticisms that led to AEDPA, and AEDPA’s empirical results. Finally, in light of
these developments, this Article proposes several changes to AEDPA that can act as
a starting point for compromise between AEDPA’s proponents and detractors. These
proposals would loosen AEDPA’s procedural hurdles for capital cases while
restricting and streamlining procedures for noncapital cases. This way, prisoners on
death row are offered a stronger procedural guarantee of fairness while principles of
federalism, state comity, and finality are preserved in the great majority of cases.
I. JUDICIAL EXPANSION OF THE WRIT FROM ANTEBELLUM TO THE EARLY
TWENTIETH CENTURY
“The historic purpose of the writ [of habeas corpus] has been to relieve
detention by executive authorities without judicial trial.”2 Compared to how the
writ is used today, the original understanding of habeas corpus was far narrower in
scope. Modern federal courts have had greater discretion to grant habeas relief for
prisoners in response to an assortment of procedural errors.3 Conversely, in the
Antebellum era, a federal court’s inquiry into the legality of a prisoner’s detention
was limited to whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction.4 Thus, in
1830, the Supreme Court entertained a habeas petition from Tobias Watkins who
was tried and convicted in a lower federal court for defrauding the federal
government.5 On his collateral attack, Watkins argued that defrauding the federal
government was neither a state common law offense nor a federal crime and
therefore his detention was illegal.6 The Court rejected Watkins’s argument and
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132.
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 533 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
3 See infra Part II.
4 See Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. 193, 193 (1830).
5 See id. at 194–96.
6 See id. at 194–95.
1
2
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held that the lower court’s decision on whether Watkins committed a federal crime
was conclusive because the lower court was a court of general jurisdiction.7
Consequently, a lower court with subject matter jurisdiction could make egregious
substantive and procedural errors but remain shielded from collateral attacks on its
decision after conviction.
Following Watkins, defendants sought to expand the definition of jurisdiction
in order to succeed on collateral attacks. For example, in Ex Parte Siebold, the
defendants collaterally attacked the sentencing court’s jurisdiction after they were
convicted “under sect. 5515 and partly under sect. 5522 of the Revised Statutes of
the United States.”8 The defendants argued that Congress lacked constitutional
authority to enact those statutes, thereby depriving the court of jurisdiction to hear
the case..9
In expanding the concept of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court determined the
constitutionality of a statute is “proper for consideration on habeas corpus” because
an unconstitutional statute is “not merely erroneous, but is illegal and void.” 10
Therefore, “if the laws are unconstitutional and void, the [lower court] acquired no
jurisdiction of the causes.”11
Subsequently, a pair of early twentieth-century cases would determine
whether constitutional error could fall within federal habeas corpus review. First, in
Frank v. Mangum, the Supreme Court determined whether habeas relief could be
granted to a defendant who asserted an unruly crowd “amounting to mob
domination” made his trial constitutionally deficient.12 Despite the defendant’s
assertions, the Court decided it could not grant federal habeas relief because the
state of Georgia—who had jurisdiction over the case—provided adequate corrective
procedures for the defendant’s claims.13 Justice Holmes dissented and argued that
“where the processes of justice are actually subverted” by a hostile mob, “the
Federal court has jurisdiction to issue the writ.”14
Eight years after Frank, the Supreme Court again determined whether legal
proceedings likely influenced by hostile mobs constituted grounds for habeas relief.
On September 30, 1919, a church congregation of African Americans was attacked
by white men.15 Racial violence broke out over the next few days, and Frank Moore,

7

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Id. at 198–99. The Court cited as authority its understanding that English courts never used habeas corpus
as a form of post-conviction relief. See id. at 202. However, modern research shows that this is untrue. See
generally PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE (Belknap Press 2010) (discussing
the Writ’s history and previously misunderstood use in a variety of legal proceedings).
Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 373–74 (1879).
Id. at 374 (1879).
Id. at 376.
Id. at 377.
Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 311–12, 332 (1915).
Id. at 327-29.
Id. at 347 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 87 (1923).

324

Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality

[10:321

among several others, was indicted for the alleged killing of a white man.16 Like in
Frank, Moore’s legal proceedings were under the threat of mob violence.17
The Court acknowledged its decision in Frank explained “corrective process
supplied by the State may be so adequate that interference by [h]abeas corpus
ought not to be allowed.”18 However, Justice Holmes, now writing for the majority,
held that if the “whole proceeding is a mask--that counsel, jury and judge were
swept to the fatal end by an irresistible wave of public passion, and that the State
Courts failed to correct the wrong,” then no amount of corrective process “can
prevent [the] Court from securing to the [defendants] their constitutional rights.”19
So far, habeas relief had already expanded far beyond its humble beginnings.
Habeas petitions began as a challenge to the sentencing court’s jurisdiction. The
concept of jurisdiction was then expanded, and finally, extreme due process
violations were added as a basis for relief. But this was just the beginning. More
and more constitutional errors, both procedural and substantive, would come into
the purview of federal habeas jurisdiction.
II. THE WRIT’S EXPANSION THROUGH THE MID-TWENTIETH CENTURY
In 1953, the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Allen and set up the modern
framework for postconviction jurisprudence. In Brown, a North Carolina state court
convicted Brown of rape and sentenced him to death.20 Brown appealed on the
ground that a coerced confession and racial discrimination during grand and petit
jury selection violated his federal constitutional rights.21 The Court ultimately
affirmed Brown’s conviction.22 However, the significance of the decision was that
the Court did not decide the case on the adequacy of State procedures, “but by
reaching and rejecting on the merits the federal claims presented which had been
previously adjudicated by the state courts.”23 Now, the question on federal habeas
review was not simply whether the State provided adequate corrective process—
which is still important—but whether the State correctly decided the merits of
constitutional issues.
Although this decision is considered a breakthrough and a fundamental shift
in federal habeas review, it is not wholly inconsistent with Justice Holmes’ decision
in Moore v. Dempsey. Recall that in Moore the Court did not necessarily find an
issue with the state’s corrective process but decided there was a federal
constitutional violation where no amount of corrective process could make up for a
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

See id.
Id. at 88-90.
Id. at 91.
Id.
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 466 (1953).
Id.
Id. at 487.
Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV.
441, 500 (1963) (emphasis added).
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sham trial.24 Although Brown is not inconsistent with Moore, Brown is likely
considered more significant because it was the first link in a chain of cases that
rapidly expanded federal habeas review. According to Professor Paul Bator, “ever
since Brown v. Allen the Supreme Court has continued to assume, without
discussion, that it is the purpose of the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction to
redetermine the merits of federal constitutional questions decided in state criminal
proceedings.”25
Just as criminal defendants tried to expand jurisdictional claims in the wake
of Watkins, criminal defendants then tried to push through a wide assortment of
claims based on the merits of their conviction. One of the most highly criticized
post-Brown cases was Fay v. Noia. There, the defendant, Noia, was given a life
sentence after his felony murder conviction in a New York state court.26 Noia did
not seek direct appellate review of his constitutional challenge—inadmissible use of
a coerced confession—until the time to do so under New York law had elapsed.27
Twenty years later, Noia finally challenged the coerced confession through a federal
habeas petition.28
The issue was whether Noia’s petition was barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2254,29
which provided in relevant part: “An application for a writ of habeas corpus in
behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be
granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available
in the courts of the State.”30 To put it succinctly, § 2254 appeared to require that a
defendant use all available state remedies to challenge their conviction before filing
a federal habeas petition. So, what would happen now that Noia can no longer
directly appeal his conviction and habeas is his only remedy?
Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan held that “§ 2254 is limited in its
application to failure to exhaust state remedies still open to the habeas applicant at
the time he files his application in federal court.”31 In other words, a federal judge
should excuse a state prisoner’s procedural default so long as the prisoner did not
deliberately bypass state remedies.32 This holding eviscerated § 2254’s exhaustion
requirements. It did not matter that Noia had at one time an option to appeal, but
that twenty years after his conviction such an option was no longer available.

24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

Moore, 261 U.S. at 91.
Bator, supra note 23, at 500.
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 394 (1963).
Id. at 395–97.
See id.
Id. at 396–98.
Id. at 396 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254).
Fay, 372 U.S. at 435.
There is an obvious advantage to a deliberate bypass in this scenario. Twenty years after the conviction,
any witnesses against Noia would either be dead, unattainable, or have limited memory of the event.
Justice Brennan apparently did not find enough evidence to conclude that such a procedural tactic was
deliberate.
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III. PUSHBACK AGAINST THE WRIT’S EXPANSION
Brown and its progeny led to much academic and political backlash. This
Part highlights some of the major criticisms and the resulting legislation to narrow
the writ.

A. Considerations Leading to AEDPA
Paul Bator led the charge against the writ’s expansion in his influential
paper Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners.33
One underlying premise of Bator’s arguments is that “no detention can ever be
finally determined to be lawful.”34 What Bator means is that no court, including the
U.S. Supreme Court, can be infallible in determining the facts and applying those
facts correctly to the proper law. Assuming that an ultimately “correct”
determination of fact or law exists, “we can never be assured that any particular
tribunal has in the past made it: we can always continue to ask whether the right
rule was applied, whether a new rule should not have been fashioned.”35 Because
we cannot say any tribunal is “correct” in the ultimate sense, the question then
becomes: When can we be satisfied that a decision is final?
Bator’s main concern is that the Brown Court did not answer this question.
Bator argues that lower courts have had difficulty defining the scope of habeas
review because the Brown Court “did not provide a principled rationalization of the
purpose being served by affording the federal court the right to review the
determination of the state court in the first instance.”36 Bator offers two possible
purposes for the Court’s rationale. First, the purpose of federal habeas review may
be to ensure that no error is made by state courts.37 If so, however, there is no
reason why a reviewing court should give deference to the trial court’s factual
findings but review the findings of law de novo. Alternatively, “if the purpose is to
assure ‘correct’ determinations that purpose should not be disregarded when the
allegation is that the state court has erred in finding the facts bearing on a
constitutional claim.”38 But again, if state courts can—after providing adequate
procedural safeguards—sufficiently guarantee that correct factual conclusions were
made, why cannot the same be said for legal conclusions?
Without clear direction from the Court on this question, there remained no
principled answer to various federalism issues. Bator believes that a federal district
court judge should not overturn the decision of a state’s highest court without a

33
34
35
36
37
38

Bator, supra note 23.
Id. at 446.
Id. at 447.
Id. at 502.
See id.
Id.
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“principled institutional justification” for it.39 One potential justification is that
federal habeas review is just an extension of the Supremacy Clause.40 However, it is
not automatically “better for federal judges to pronounce [federal law] than state
judges,” especially if the state court has done a fair and adequate job investigating
the issue.41 Furthermore, unprincipled decisions to strip state court judges of their
findings of law, regardless of the adequacy of their process, may damage their
“inner sense of responsibility, to the pride and conscientiousness, . . . in doing what
is . . . under the constitutional scheme a part of his business: the decision of federal
questions properly raised in state litigation.”42
Finally, Bator points out that the federal judicial system has limited
resources.43 Those limited resources are continuously strained against a rapidly
increasing number of federal habeas petitions filed by state prisoners.44 In 1950,
“there were 560 habeas petitions filed by state prisoners in the federal district
courts.”45 However, by 1961, two years before Bator published his article, the
number increased to 906.46 As will be discussed below, the upward trend of habeas
petitions has accelerated at a pace far greater than the resources provided to the
federal judicial system.47
Judge Henry J. Friendly shared the same concerns over judicial conservation
of resources. In his article, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal
Judgments, Judge Friendly regards the drain of judicial resources as “the most
serious single evil with today's proliferation of collateral attack.”48 In support of this
notion, Judge Friendly brings up “Justice Jackson's never refuted observation that
‘[i]t must prejudice the occasional meritorious application to be buried in a flood of
worthless ones.’”49 In the same vein, Bator writes that it is not only the lack of time
and money that prejudice meritorious claims, but also the strained “intellectual and
moral energies and intensities of our judges.”50
Judge Friendly provides three more reasons in support of his argument that
“with a few important exceptions, convictions should be subject to collateral attack
only when the prisoner supplements his constitutional plea with a colorable claim of
innocence.”51 First, that "it is essential to the educational and deterrent functions of
39
40
41
42
43
44

45
46
47
48

49
50
51

Id. at 505.
See U.S. Const. art. VI.
Id.
Id. at 506 (emphasis in original).
See id.
Id. (“[T]he doctrine of Brown v. Allen must be assessed in light of the strains put on the federal judicial
system itself by the ever increasing flood of habeas petitions from state prisoners.”)
Id. at 506 n.183.
See id.
See infra Part IV.A.
Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV.
142, 148 (1970).
Id. at 149 (alteration in original) (citing Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
Bator, supra note 23, at 506.
Friendly, supra note 48, at 142.
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the criminal law that we be able to say that one violating that law will swiftly and
certainly become subject to punishment."52 Second, that the “longer the delay” in
final determinations of fact, the “less the reliability of the determination of any
factual issue giving rise to the attack.”53 And finally, the societal desire for finality
in criminal cases.54
The concerns and criticisms laid out by Bator and Judge Friendly resonated
strongly within the legal community. In the 1980s, a commission was formed to
guide congressional action for federal habeas corpus.55 The result was the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.
B. The Powell Committee and AEDPA
In June 1988, Chief Justice Rehnquist created the Ad Hoc Committee on
Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases (“The Powell Committee”).56 The Powell
Committee formed in response to “piecemeal and repetitious litigation and years of
delay between sentencing and a judicial resolution as to whether the sentence was
permissible under the law,” and a “lack of finality [that] undermine[d] public
confidence in [the] criminal justice system.”57 Chief Justice Rehnquist directed the
Committee to “inquire into the necessity and desirability of legislation directed
toward avoiding delay and the lack of finality in capital cases in which the prisoner
had or had been offered counsel.”58
The Powell Committee found three major issues with the then-current state
of federal habeas review. First, the Powell Committee found widespread
“unnecessary delay and repetition.”59
These deficiencies were due to:
(1) a lack of coordination between federal and state legal systems,
resulting in prisoners moving back and forth between the two systems
before exhausting state remedies; (2) prisoners filing excessive, last
minute motions for stays of execution; and (3) the absence of a statute
of limitation allows for prisoners to file multiple petitions at any point
during their incarceration.60

52
53
54
55
56

57
58
59
60

Id. at 146 (quoting Bator, supra note 23, at 452) (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 147.
Id. at 149.
See infra Part III.B.
AD HOC COMM. ON FED. HABEAS CORPUS IN CAP. CASES, AD HOC COMM. ON FED. HABEAS CORPUS IN CAP. CASES
COMM. REP., as reprinted in 135 CONG. REC. 24,694 (1989). The Committee was spearheaded by former
Associate Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Id.
Id. at 24,694.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
LISA M. SEGHETTI & NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33259, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF:
BACKGROUND, LEGISLATION, AND ISSUES 3 (2006).
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Second, the Powell Committee found a “pressing need for qualified counsel to
represent inmates in collateral review.”61 Capital habeas litigation may be complex,
and capital inmates are “almost uniformly” indigent and “often illiterate or
uneducated.”62 This dichotomy “results in delayed or ineffective federal collateral
procedure[ ]” and “appointment of qualified counsel only when an execution is
imminent.”63 Unfortunately, competent counsel at this stage of litigation amounts to
little as many constitutional challenges are often waived and the severe time
pressure is severe.64
Third, the then-current system resulted in last-minute litigation whereby
constitutional claims would only emerge “when prompted by the setting of an
execution date.”65 In a nod to Bator and Judge Friendly’s concerns, the Powell
Committee found that “[j]udicial resources are expended” as a result of the time
pressures.66 The exigent time pressure caused concern that “[j]ustice may be illserved” in capital cases.67 Noteworthy is the Powell Committee’s concern over
sandbagging, which was the source of heavy criticism in Fay v. Noia. Here, the
Committee wrote that sometimes “attorneys appear to have intentionally delayed
filing until time pressures were severe.”68 Furthermore, the Powell Committee
“believe[d]” that successive petitions usually “are filed at the eleventh hour seeking
nothing more than delay.”69
The Powell Committee proposed several statutory procedures for federal
habeas corpus review of capital sentences where competent counsel had been
provided. Some of the proposals include “a six-month period within which the
federal habeas petition must be filed”; an “automatic stay of execution” that stays
“in place until federal habeas proceedings are completed or until the prisoner . . .
fail[s] to file a petition within the [statutorily] allotted time”; and an exhaustion
requirement, which requires prisoners to raise their claims in state court first.70
The goal of these proposals was to achieve the following: “Capital cases should be
subject to one complete and fair course of collateral review in the state and federal
system, free from the time pressure of impending execution, and with the assistance
of competent counsel for the defendant. When this review has concluded, litigation
should end.”71

61

62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71

AD HOC COMM. ON FED. HABEAS CORPUS IN CAP. CASES, AD HOC COMM. ON FED. HABEAS CORPUS IN CAP. CASES
COMM. REP., as reprinted in 135 CONG. REC. 24,694, 24,695 (1989).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Following the Powell Committee’s findings, Congress passed AEDPA and
received President Bill Clinton’s signature.72 AEDPA reformed habeas litigation for
both capital and noncapital prisoners and sought to resolve previously “unclear
standards and confusing rules.”73 The most significant changes include “tighter
filing deadlines, limitations on successive petitions, restrictions on evidentiary
hearings, heightened exhaustion and deference standards and specific capital case
standards.”74
It is important to understand that although AEDPA reformed habeas
litigation for capital and noncapital cases, the focus of the Powell Committee was
strictly capital cases.75 The Committee reasoned that capital inmates “ha[ve] every
incentive to delay the proceedings that must take place before that sentence is
carried out.”76 Conversely, noncapital prisoners “have every incentive to bring their
claims to resolution as soon as possible in order to gain relief.”77 The thesis of this
Article, which advocates loosening AEDPA’s procedural hurdles for capital cases, is
antithetical to the Powell Committee’s findings and to AEDPA’s major purposes.
However, the following Part highlights post-AEDPA statistics that show AEDPA’s
goals have not been met.78 Rather, the issues that led to AEDPA have only been
exacerbated. Therefore, change is needed and the compromise outlined in this
Article offers the best solution among competing interests.
IV. AEDPA’S STATISTICAL RESULTS
This Part will first show that empirical data supports the need to amend
AEDPA. Next, data will be used to suggest where change ought to be made.
A. Statistics Support Change
Statistical evidence concerning the number of post-AEDPA habeas petitions
filed by state prisoners sheds light on AEDPA’s mixed success. Before diving into
the statistics, recall the underlying premises and concerns that led to AEDPA.
First, there was a massive increase in state prisoner habeas corpus filings
following Brown and its progeny. Per the Department of Justice, habeas petitions
by state prisoners increased from 1,020 in 1961 to 8,059 in 1982.79 This is nearly a
72

73

74
75

76
77
78
79

CONGRESS.GOV, S.735 - Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/104th-congress/senate-bill/735.
Thomas F. Gede, Major Habeas Reform Package Becomes Law, FEDERALIST SOC’Y (Dec. 1, 1996),
https://fedsoc.org/commentary/publications/major-habeas-reform-package-becomes-law.
Id.
AD HOC COMM. ON FED. HABEAS CORPUS IN CAP. CASES, AD HOC COMM. ON FED. HABEAS CORPUS IN CAP. CASES
COMM. REP., as reprinted in 135 CONG. REC. 24,694, 24,695 (1989).
Id.
Id.
See infra Part IV.A.
BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FEDERAL REVIEW OF STATE PRISONER PETITIONS: HABEAS CORPUS
2 (1984).
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700% increase in twenty years and understandably led to concern over judicial
resources. As Bator put it, there was concern over conservation of “not only simple
economic resources, but all of the intellectual, moral, and political resources
involved in the legal system.”80 The strain on judicial resources would supposedly
“prejudice the occasional meritorious application” because it is “buried in a flood of
worthless ones.”81
It was not only the sheer number of habeas petitions that led to AEDPA. The
Powell Committee was also adamant about reducing the length of time it took for a
capital prisoner to actually receive his death sentence.82 This coincides with Bator’s
and Judge Friendly’s need for finality in criminal judgments.
It logically follows that if AEDPA were successful, it should have achieved at
least the following three goals. First, the total number of federal habeas filings by
state prisoners (in proportion to prison populations) should have decreased. Second,
in response to the decrease in habeas petitions, there should be a higher percentage
of granted relief because the judiciary can focus their resources and energies on
meritorious claims. And third, capital cases should come to a final resolution more
quickly. What do the results show?
Starting with total number of habeas petitions filed by state prisoners, a 2007
empirical study on AEDPA’s effects found that each year since AEDPA was passed,
“more than 18,000 cases, or one out of every 14 civil cases filed in federal district
courts, are filed by state prisoners seeking habeas corpus relief, and more than
6,000 of these cases reach the courts of appeals.”83 At face value, the increase from
8,059 filings in 1982 compared with over 18,000 each year after AEDPA was
adopted is daunting. However, the raw numbers must be compared with the
exponential increase in the U.S. prison population. Since the Supreme Court
decided a state prisoner’s habeas petition on the merits in Brown, the prison
population rose from “less than 150,000 prisoners in the 1940s to about 1,400,000
prisoners today.”84 When habeas petitions are combined with prisoner population
data, the statistics show that “habeas filings per prisoner [have] remained roughly
constant.”85 Indeed, Professors Nancy King and Joseph Hoffmann argue that “[t]he
modern explosion in state prisoner populations overwhelmed, and masked, a long
and gradual decline in the rate of habeas filings per prisoner.”86 It is hard to tell if
this is a victory for AEDPA’s advocates. Technically, the decreased rate of habeas
filings suggests that AEDPA has been somewhat successful. But if the total number

80
81
82

83

84
85
86

Bator, supra note 23, at 451.
Brown v. Allen, 344 US. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
See AD HOC COMM. ON FED. HABEAS CORPUS IN CAP. CASES, AD HOC COMM. ON FED. HABEAS CORPUS IN CAP.
CASES COMM. REP., as reprinted in 135 CONG. REC. 24,694, 24,695 (1989).
NANCY J. KING, FRED L. CHEESMAN II & BRIAN J. OSTROM, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, FINAL TECHNICAL
REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS 9-10 (2007).
BRANDON GARRETT & LEE KOVARSKY, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS 136 (1st ed. 2013).
Id.
NANCY J. KING & JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN, HABEAS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 70 (2011).
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of filings is still double that of 1982, then conservation of judicial resources has not
been achieved.
Regarding capital cases, two comparative findings between post- and preAEDPA studies are of concern. First, the total time for a habeas filing to reach
resolution has increased,87 and not by a little. Rather, capital habeas filings took “at
least twice as long to finish, on average, than prior to AEDPA.”88 Pre-AEDPA, “the
average disposition time[s] for . . . capital habeas case[s] involving . . . first
petition[s] was 15 months,” while after AEDPA, there were “averages of 29 months
for the disposition of terminated capital cases, 30.4 months for non-transferred first
petitions, and 37.3 months so far for all cases including those still pending.”89
The second comparative finding of concern is that the rate of granted relief
for capital cases has decreased. The 2007 study found “[a]bout one in eight or 12.4%
of 267 terminated capital cases that filed in 2000, 2001, and 2002 received relief.”90
Compared with the “40% grant rate” for “capital cases that had already made it
through both the federal district and appellate courts by 1995,” the current grant
rate is shockingly low.91
Similar results were found for noncapital cases. The 2007 study found that
“[o]verall disposition time per case has increased on average since AEDPA,” with an
average of “at least a year in federal court before they are completed.”92
Additionally, like capital cases, the grant rate by district courts for non-capital
cases has decreased from one in 100 (pre-AEDPA) to one in 284 (post-AEDPA).93
What can we make of these statistics? The most obvious inference is that the
Powell Committee’s goal to reduce the “years of delay between sentencing and a
judicial resolution” has not been achieved.94 Furthermore, it is not clear that
meritorious claims have distinguished themselves from frivolous claims. Otherwise,
there would have been an increase in the relief rate for both capital and noncapital
prisoners.
Of course, it is impossible to pinpoint AEDPA’s direct effects on both the
delays between sentencing and resolution, and the reduction in relief rates. This is
mainly because of the exponential increase in the prisoner population that
undoubtedly has strained judicial resources as much as, or likely more than, the
expansion of the writ. It is possible that without AEDPA the delays and relief rates
would be even worse, but this is simply speculation. What we do know, however, is
that the main priorities of AEDPA have not been achieved. Therefore, statutory
changes are warranted.
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B. Where Can Change Be Made?
This Article posits that statistical evidence would support a potential
compromise between expanding the writ and supporting fundamental concepts
(such as federalism and state comity) by loosening AEDPA’s procedural hurdles for
capital prisoners while further restricting procedures for noncapital prisoners.
Between 1990 and 1996 (pre-AEDPA), there was an average of 12,656 state
non-capital federal habeas corpus petitions and 141 state capital federal habeas
corpus petitions filed per year.95 Capital petitions were therefore, on average, about
1.1% of all habeas petitions filed by state prisoners. Between 1997 and 2004 (postAEDPA), an average of 18,758 state non-capital cases and 198 state capital federal
habeas corpus cases had been filed by prisoners in state custody.96 Post-AEDPA,
capital petitions made up 1.05% of the total federal habeas petitions filed by state
prisoners. In total, non-capital petitions increased by 48% while capital petitions
increased by 40%.
These statistics show that rate of increase for noncapital petitions is
outpacing that of capital petitions. While this immediately suggests the focus of
AEDPA reform should lie on noncapital cases, these numbers are not the whole
story. Empirical data shows that “[i]t takes on average one extra year for death row
inmates to reach federal court compared to non-capital petitioners.”97 Furthermore,
“[c]apital petitioners raised on average seven times as many claims as non-capital
petitioners.”98 However, while this shows that capital cases certainly take up more
resources per case, it does not compare to the sheer volume of noncapital cases.
Indeed, noncapital petitions have also increased the number of claims per petition
since AEDPA’s enactment. Whereas between 11% and 25% of noncapital cases
included four or more claims prior to AEDPA, as of August 2007 over 41% of
noncapital cases included four or more claims.99 But let’s assume for argument’s
sake that every single noncapital petition includes only, on average, two claims.
That would equal, on average, 37,516 claims by noncapital prisoners.100 Now let’s
assume that every single capital petition includes 100 claims. The total number of
capital claims would be 19,800.101 In this extreme scenario, capital claims would
only make up 34.5% of total claims. Therefore, the statistics show that loosening
procedural hurdles for capital prisoners would put a minimal strain on judicial
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resources while efforts to curtail noncapital petitions would better conserve such
resources.
Even though the compromise advanced in this Article would likely conserve
judicial resources, one of the major criticisms of the writ’s expansion was the lack of
finality in criminal convictions.102 Indeed, the purpose of the Powell Committee was
“to inquire into ‘the necessity and desirability of legislation directed toward
avoiding delay and the lack of finality’ in capital cases.”103 While this Article
acknowledges the need for finality in criminal convictions, this Article nevertheless
posits that death is different.
V. DEATH IS DIFFERENT: A RESPONSE TO FINALITY
While finality in criminal convictions is important for society, no punishment
is as final as death. Once the sentence is executed, any errors are moot. Therefore, if
it takes longer to get it right, so be it.
The Powell Committee wrote in its proposal that the guilt of the “inmate
under captial [sic] sentence” is “frequently . . . never in question.”104 However, the
Powell Committee made its conclusions in 1989 when DNA testing just began its
major role in the criminal justice system.105 As early as 2002, the Supreme Court
stated that “we cannot ignore the fact that in recent years a disturbing number of
inmates on death row have been exonerated.”106 Per the Innocence Project, “375
people in the United States have been exonerated by DNA testing, including 21 who
served time on death row.”107 However, “DNA evidence is not available or probative
in the vast majority of criminal cases.”108
This is not a moral tirade against the death penalty. In certain cases, the
death penalty serves an important societal purpose as both punishment and
deterrent. However, the importance of finality as argued by Bator is severely
diminished in the face of so many exonerations. A single innocent man or woman
that is wrongly sentenced to death is one too many. With that said, society should
strictly adhere to the law, and judges should impose the death penalty when
required by law, even if doing so is against their own moral beliefs. But as a start,
AEDPA can become more accommodating to capital prisoners so that we know
death row inmates had every chance to challenge a potentially erroneous sentence.
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VI. POTENTIAL COMPROMISES
While it has strongly focused on the ultimate finality of the death penalty,
this Article will not dismiss the underlying concerns that led to AEDPA, including
conservation of judicial resources, state comity, and federalism. Indeed, federalism,
through which “a double security arises to the rights of the people,” must be
respected in this complex area of law.109 Therefore, the following are potential
changes to AEDPA that may serve as a compromise between the many competing
interests in federal habeas corpus.
A. Innocence Gateway for Successive Petitions: Return to Schlup
In capital cases, the innocence gateway for successive claims should be
expanded. Prior to AEDPA, federal courts followed the Schlup v. Delo standard.110
In Schlup, a death row prisoner alleged in his second habeas petition that the jury
at his trial was deprived of evidence that would establish his innocence.111 The
district court denied the petition because the prisoner did not show "by clear and
convincing evidence that, but for a constitutional error, no reasonable juror would
have found" him guilty.112 Although the U.S. Supreme Court previously articulated
the “clear and convincing standard”—called the Sawyer standard113—the Court had
to decide whether that “standard provides adequate protection against the kind of
miscarriage of justice that would result from the execution of a person who is
actually innocent.”114 The Court held that the Sawyer standard was too stringent115
and instead required the prisoner to show “a constitutional violation has probably
resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.”116
The Court acknowledged that Congress previously fashioned rules that
disfavored successive claims due to “increasing burdens on the federal courts and to
contain the threat to finality and comity.”117 However, the Court noted that “the
principles of comity and finality that inform the concepts of cause and prejudice
‘must yield to the imperative of correcting a fundamentally unjust incarceration.’”118
AEDPA overturned the Schlup standard and now provides:
(2) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus
application under section 2254 that was not presented in a prior
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application shall be dismissed unless . . . (B)(ii) the facts underlying
the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole,
would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that,
but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found
the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.119
The return to Sawyer’s clear and convincing evidence standard goes against habeas
corpus’ core purpose as “an equitable remedy.”120 Furthermore, as discussed, the
countervailing assertions of finality have been greatly diminished in light of the
vast number of exonerations. The balance between justice and finality has simply
shifted toward the former. Therefore, AEDPA should be amended to direct courts to
apply the Schlup standard where a capital prisoner asserts a claim on a successive
petition that was not presented in a prior application.
B. Reinvigorate Retroactivity Relief
For capital cases, Congress should expand retroactive relief by removing
AEDPA’s “clearly established Federal law” language. AEDPA provides:
(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted
with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State
court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—(1) resulted in
a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States.121
Section 2254(d) bars relief for claims based on new decisions by the Supreme Court.
Rather, habeas relief is restricted to those claims based on “clearly established”
Supreme Court rulings.122 This suggests that if the Supreme Court has yet to
address an issue, a district court cannot grant habeas relief based on precedent by
the courts of appeals or other district courts—even if the prisoner’s constitutional
rights are clearly violated.
The goal for amendment of this provision would be to abolish the distinction
between whether the Supreme Court has established a “new” rule or clarified an
“old” one. By eliminating this distinction, a capital prisoner could benefit from a
“new” or “old” rule. This would hopefully prevent constitutional dilemmas where
two prisoners sentenced to death under violation of the same law would have
different outcomes based on whether they were sentenced before or after the
Supreme Court ruled on an issue.
To illustrate, consider Schriro v. Summerlin, where Summerlin was convicted
of first-degree murder and sexual assault by the jury, and the judge determined and
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applied aggravating factors and raised the punishment to death.123 While
Summerlin sat on death row, the Supreme Court decided Ring v. Arizona and held
that aggravating factors must be determined by a jury, rather than a judge.124 In
determining whether to apply Ring retroactively to Summerlin’s case, the Court
held that it did not because the Ring rule was neither a substantive nor a
procedural rule central to an accurate determination of innocence or guilt.125
One issue pointed to by the dissent is that while Summerlin will be sentenced
to death, a subsequent prisoner will have the advantage of Ring’s constitutional
ruling and will avoid the death penalty.126 How can it be that two men who violate
the same law will have a different outcome when the Supreme Court’s ruling on the
issue could theoretically be applied to both?
The issue is due to the distinction between “new” and “old” rules that is now
codified in § 2254(d)(1).127 By abolishing this distinction in the capital case context,
we can create uniformity for prisoners on death row, and prevent death sentences
reached through unconstitutional procedures.
C. Remove Court of Appeals Authorization for Successive Petitions
AEDPA creates an unnecessary procedural hurdle that should be removed for
both capital and noncapital cases. AEDPA provides: “[b]efore a second or successive
application permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall
move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court
to consider the application.”128 A “three-judge panel of the court of appeals” can then
authorize the filing of the successive or second petition if it determines that the
petitioner “makes a prima facie showing that the application satisfies the
requirements of” § 2244(b).129
Why have this extra step in the process? Could we not bypass the court of
appeals and direct the district court judge to dismiss successive petitions that do not
make a prima facie showing that the § 2244(b) exceptions are met? This provision
purports to create a screening process whereby frivolous matters are dismissed
before a hard inquiry is taken. But it is difficult to see how any of the purposes of
AEDPA—state comity, conservation of judicial resources, etc.—are met by this
procedural hurdle.
If the petitioner fails to make a prima facie showing, then the petition
consumes the resources (in terms of time, money, and intellectual capacity) of three
judges. The post-conviction process would be better served if only one judge’s
resources (that is, the district court judge’s resources) were used. And if the panel
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does find a prima facie case was shown and the case is sent off to the district court,
now a total of four judges have reviewed the case when, again, only one was
necessary. Is any reason provided why extra judges must be involved in this step?
Surely a single district court judge can make the prima facie determination as
competently as a panel of appellate judges. Furthermore, it seems that state comity
is further diminished by adding a second layer of review to state determinations of
fact and law. Because judicial resources are wasted and state comity is not
furthered, removal of this arbitrary step is a win-win for both anti- and pro-AEDPA
advocates.
D. Shift Harmless Error Burden on Noncapital Petitioners
On collateral review, noncapital state prisoners should have the burden of
proving that a trial error was not harmless. As Chief Justice Traynor has described,
[harmless errors] are the insects of the world of law, travelling
through it in swarms, often unnoticed in their endless procession.
Many are plainly harmless; some appear ominously harmful. Some,
for all the benign appearance of their spindly traces, mark the way for
a plague of followers that deplete trials of fairness. 130
Despite this, the “well-being of the law encompasses a tolerance for harmless errors
adrift in an imperfect world.”131 The question is, therefore, when do we permit
harmless errors? And whose burden is it to prove whether an error is harmless?
In Brecht v. Abrahamson, the Supreme Court appeared to give the habeas
petitioner the burden of proving harmless error on collateral attack.132 The
petitioner challenged the prosecutor’s “use for impeachment purposes of petitioner’s
post-Miranda silence.”133 Based on principles of state comity and federalism, the
Court decided that the previous Chapman standard, which on direct appeal
required the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an error was
harmless,134 did not apply to collateral review.135 Rather, on collateral review, the
Court adopted the Kotteakos standard, which requires that the error have a
“substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict” in
order to grant relief.136 This Kotteakos burden appeared to fall squarely on the
prisoner because the Court stated that habeas petitioners are “not entitled to
habeas relief based on trial error unless they [the defendant] can establish that it
[the error] resulted in actual prejudice.”137 However, in O’Neal v. McAninch, the
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Court explained that there is not a “burden,” so to speak, because a court’s harmless
error analysis requires an assessment of the entire trial record.138 Rather, the Court
held that “[w]hen a federal judge in a habeas proceeding is in grave doubt about
whether a trial error of federal law had substantial and injurious effect or influence
in determining the jury's verdict, that error is not harmless. And, the petitioner
must win.”139
In noncapital cases, a burden should be imposed on the habeas petitioner
under a preponderance of the evidence standard. To word it alternatively, if the
harmless error analysis appears to be a fifty-fifty determination, then the State
should receive the benefit of the doubt. Presumably, at this point in the litigation
the State has already met their burden at trial and throughout the State appellate
process. So long as the State appellate procedures were fair, then it would diminish
state comity and federalism to now put the State on the defensive.
AEDPA does not speak on the issue of harmless error. Therefore, this proposal
is an addition, rather than a revision, of the federal habeas corpus statutes. With this
addition, the integrity of the trial court and the jury is fortified while principles of
state comity and federalism are maintained.
CONCLUSION
The scope of federal habeas corpus is an ever-changing landscape. The
ideologically driven debates that led to AEDPA are still prominent but must now be
reassessed in light of AEDPA’s actual, and not theoretical, results. AEDPA’s main
goals for finality, conservation of judicial resources, and shortening the length
between sentencing and punishment, have not been met. Therefore, change is clearly
warranted and a compromise between capital and noncapital habeas laws appears to
be a good starting point.
This Article has suggested several statutory changes as a basis for this
compromise, including: expansion of the innocence gateway for successive petitions
and increasing retroactive relief for capital prisoners, removing the arbitrary
screening panel of federal appellate judges for both capital and noncapital
prisoners, and shifting the harmless error burden onto noncapital prisoners on
collateral review. These changes will likely improve conservation of judicial
resources, promote federalism, and maintain state comity. Simultaneously,
prisoners on death row will be guaranteed a procedurally sound avenue for ensuring
that their constitutional defenses are heard.
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